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Summary 
The response brief reveals that the standard of review is dispositive. The district 
court entered summary judgment on seven different causes of action1 on the sole ground 
that Stevens-Henager provided no evidence to create a disputed issue of material fact 
concerning damages. Under the correct standard of review, ^his court not only assumes 
liability but also draws all reasonable inferences concerning damages in the light most 
favorable to Stevens-Henager—the nonmoving party. If there is any disputed fact 
concerning whether Stevens-Henager was damaged, then summary judgment was 
inappropriate. While the response brief initially acknowledges the correct standard of 
review, its analysis draws all inferences in the light least favorable to Stevens-Henager, 
the opposite of what the standard requires. 
Under the correct standard of review, Stevens-Henager provided ample evidence 
that it was damaged when Eagle Gate (i) engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager 
employees, (ii) had those employees steal computer files from Stevens-Henager and 
corrupt Stevens-Henager's files rendering its data (contact information for potential 
students) unusable, and then (iii) used those stolen files to recruit new students for itself. 
Stevens-Henager provided specific evidence of numerous categories of damages: (i) lost 
productivity due to the loss of experienced employees; (ii) costs of hiring and training 
less experienced and less productive employees; (iii) costs of advertising and marketing 
rendered ineffective when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that advertising and 
1
 Stevens-Henager sought damages for (i) breach of contract} (ii) violation of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (iii) interference with contractual relations; (iv) interference 
with prospective economic relations; (v) violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act; (vi) unfair competition; and (vii) civil conspiracy, (R. 1-30.) 
1 
marketing; (iv) effects of reduced morale at two campuses; and (v) lost tuition payments 
from students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-Henager. (R. 3332-35.) 
While Stevens-Henager did not precisely quantify these categories of damages, 
Eagle Gate recognizes in the response brief—as it must—that quantification at the 
summary judgment stage is not required under Utah law. (Resp. Br. at 28-30.) In other 
words, evidence that a defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of damages is 
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion directed only at damages. Stevens-
Henager provided more than enough evidence that Eagle Gate's illegal conduct 
proximately caused damages to preclude summary judgment. 
Recognizing that Stevens-Henager provided sufficient non-expert testimony of its 
damages, Eagle Gate quotes Stevens-Henager's counsel out of context to suggest it was 
undisputed that all damages required expert testimony. While Stevens-Henager's counsel 
acknowledged the importance of expert testimony to establish some damages—e.g., 
quantification of certain lost profits—Stevens-Henager maintained in its summary 
judgment papers and at the hearing that the testimony of three non-expert witnesses was 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. (R. 3332-35; 3574:14.) Most obviously, 
"specialized knowledge" is unnecessary to establish that Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of 
valuable Stevens-Henager employees caused damage to Stevens-Henager. 
As for the three subsequent orders that are based, in part, on the entry of summary 
judgment, this court should vacate those orders without prejudice to permit the district 
court to consider whether to enter the same three rulings in the absence of the erroneous 
summary judgment ruling. For these reasons, this court should vacate all four orders. 
2 
Argument 
The primary issue on appeal is whether Stevens-Henager provided evidence of 
damages sufficient to preclude summary judgment. It did. In light of the response brief, 
it is important to become clear on a few points, which are dispositive. 
First, because Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment was based upon its 
contention that Stevens-Henager could not prove "any damages," (R. 3155), summary 
judgment was inappropriate if Stevens-Henager provided any evidence of damages. For 
that reason, Eagle Gate's argument that Stevens-Henager could not prove damages 
because it provided no expert testimony is beside the point unless all damages outlined by 
Stevens-Henager require expert testimony. Yet Eagle Gate does not establish that expert 
testimony was necessary to establish all damages—e.g., lost productivity of a key 
employee or costs of marketing efforts made ineffective by Eagle Gate's illegal 
conduct—but instead suggests that Stevens-Henager represerited that expert testimony 
was required to establish all damages in this case. (Resp. Br. at 25-26.) As demonstrated 
below, Stevens-Henager made no such sweeping representation. Instead, Stevens-
Henager provided non-expert testimony in its papers opposing summary judgment and 
cited that same non-expert testimony to the district court at thp summary judgment 
hearing. Expert testimony was not required to establish all damages. 
Second, as Eagle Gate correctly acknowledged in the response brief (Resp. Br. at 
28-39), to preclude summary judgment Utah law required Stevens-Henager only to 
provide evidence that Eagle Gate's illegal conduct proximately caused damages, not to 
quantify those damages. As demonstrated below, Stevens-Henager provided evidence 
that Eagle Gate's conduct was the proximate cause of numerous categories of damages. 
3 
Third, contrary to how the response brief construes Stevens-Henager's evidence of 
damages (Resp. Br. at 29-38), in reviewing an order granting summary judgment this 
court views 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party," and affirms only if there exists "no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr., 2007 UT App 235, % 13, 166 P.3d 614. Construing evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party furthers the important "general judicial 
policy that favors a trial on the merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a 
summary judgment." King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864-65 (Utah 1992). 
In the end, the non-expert testimony showing that Stevens-Henager was damaged 
by Eagle Gate's illegal conduct is sufficient to defeat summary judgment and preclude 
Eagle Gate from escaping all liability for its illegal acts. This court should reverse. 
I. Stevens-Henager Provided Evidence of Its Damages 
Under Utah law, "thin" evidence of proximate cause precludes summary 
judgment. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, <| 33, 116 P.3d 323. For example, 
evidence that illegal conduct increased the price of real property—even without evidence 
of how much the price increased—is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Id. 
Evidence that medical malpractice caused loss of vision—even without evidence of the 
extent of vision loss or damages resulting from that loss— -^is sufficient to preclude 
summary judgment. Sohm v. Dixie Eye Or., 2007 UT App 235, ffi[ 19-20, 166 P.3d 614. 
And evidence that an insurance company's failure to defend a lawsuit caused the plaintiff 
to incur costs in defending the lawsuit—even without evidence of those costs—is 
sufficient to preclude judgment as a matter of law. Renegade Oil, Inc. v. Progressive 
4 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App 356, f l 3 , 101 P.3d 383. Thus, "[w]hen evidence supports a 
finding of the fact of damage, i.e., proximate cause, a defendant should not escape 
liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with precision." Sohm, 2007 
UT App 235, Tf 20. Escaping liability for illegal acts is what Eagle Gate seeks to do. 
Eagle Gate does not challenge that liability stems from its (i) predatory hiring of 
Stevens-Henager employees, (ii) having those employees steal computer files from 
Stevens-Henager and alter Stevens-Henager5s files so the data (contact information for 
prospective students) in the files was unusable, and then (iii) using those stolen files not 
only to undermine Stevens-Henager's ability to take advantage of its marketing efforts 
but also to recruit new students for itself. Based upon that illegal conduct, Stevens-
Henager provided evidence of a number of categories of damages: (i) lost productivity of 
the experienced employees stolen by Eagle Gate; (ii) costs of training less experienced 
and less productive employees; (iii) costs associated with ineffective advertising and 
marketing when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that advertising and marketing; 
(iv) effects of reduced morale on various campuses; and (v) l0st tuition payments from 
students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-Henager. (R. 3332-35.) 
The specific evidence of proximate cause is as follows: Carol Gastiger testified 
that when Stevens-Henager9 s computer files were altered (phone numbers changed) so it 
could not contact prospective students from the targeted "Tongan population," Stevens-
Henager was damaged because it had spent money recruiting that population.2 (R. 3332.) 
2
 "I think the loss of the Tongan population. I think the mon^y we extended on it. I 
mean in very real dollars. And in very non-real dollars, in time and effort. That are not 
in specific dollars." (R. 3332.) This testimony shows money spent on marketing to the 
Tongan population rendered ineffective by Eagle Gate and presents a jury question to 
translate the time and effort spent on that marketing into a darpage amount. 
5 
Vicki Dewsnup confirmed that the money spent on "advertising and marketing" was 
wasted when Eagle Gate misappropriated the student leads the advertising and marketing 
had generated.3 (R. 3333.) Ms. Dewsnup also confirmed that Stevens-Henager could not 
contact its student leads because Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct had left Stevens-Henager 
without "adequate phone numbers."4 (R. 3333.) This evidence of damages is sufficient 
to preclude summary judgment. 
Carl Barney testified about the costs of having to "rebuild the admissions 
department," and Ms. Dewsnup testified about the "loss of employees" stemming from 
Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager5s admissions director.5 (R. 3333-35.) 
Ms. Gastiger testified that Stevens-Henager5 s productivity suffered when Eagle Gate 
hired Stevens-Henager5s experienced "Admissions Consullant."6 (R. 3332-33.) This 
evidence of damages also is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
"There's extensive costs incurred in advertising and marketing.55 (R. 3333.) 
4
 "We continue to use any leads that come into the college from time to time, and with 
the loss of adequate phone numbers due to the admissions by Mr. Rogers, it became 
difficult, if not impossible, to use our own leads." (R. 3333.) 
5
 "The cost of hiring and training new people. The efforts to rebuild the admissions 
department." (R. 3335.) 
6
 "I believe that when you lose a very competent Admissions Consultant you lose 
production for a period of time. That results in - let's say that I replace Tecia and the 
other person starts five people a month. Tecia is averaging eight. That's a total of nine 
people in a given three-month period of time, if this other person ever gets as good as 
Tecia." (R. 3332.) 
That testimony is perhaps the best example of Eagle Gate's construing evidence in the 
light least favorable to Stevens-Henager, as Eagle Gate assumes Ms. Gastiger is speaking 
in hypotheticals and is not describing damages related to the loss of the experienced 
admissions consultant independent of the actual efficiency of the people who did her job 
after her departure. (Resp. Br. at 31-32.) Eagle Gate asserts in its response brief that 
there is no evidence that Stevens-Henager had to replace the admissions directors, but 
Mr. Barney testified that Stevens-Henager had to "rebuild the admissions department,55 
which is evidence that someone had to do the job of the former admissions director, a 
proposition sufficiently supported by common sense in any event. (R. 3334-35.) 
6 
Mr. Barney testified about the costs of the "loss of the [student] starts" for "at least 
two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden," which resulted froifr the stolen and altered files 
and which led to a reduction in "an income stream over three or four years." (R. 3334-
35.) And Ms. Dewsnup and Mr. Barney testified about damage to morale at the 
campuses that resulted from altering the files, stealing files, ^nd predatory hiring of the 
admissions director.8 (R. 3333-35.) This evidence of damages also is sufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. 
Eagle Gate attempts to resist this straightforward conclusion by (i) implying that 
expert testimony was required for all damages in this case an^ (ii) citing a case holding 
that, where expert testimony is necessary to prove damages, failure to provide expert 
testimony is fatal. (Resp. Br. at 22-26 (citing Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 
2009 UT App 347, \ 23, 222 P.3d 775).) Eagle Gate's argument is beside the point 
because (i) expert testimony is not required for all damages in this case, and (ii) counsel 
for Stevens-Henager never stated that expert testimony was required for all damages. 
First, Eagle Gate has cited no cases—because there are none—that expert 
testimony is required to prove damages resulting from, for example, the loss of an 
admissions director or costs of marketing rendered ineffective when the fruits of that 
marketing were stolen. Expert testimony is not required to establish such damages. 
7
 "The damage to at least two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden. . . . The decline of 
starts. . . . The loss of starts, which then would result into an income stream over three or 
four years." (R. 3335.) 
8
 "The decline of the morale. The struggle.5' (R. 3335.) "Thfre was economic damage, 
certainly, and also damage to morale at the campuses affected." (R. 3334.) 
7 
Second, the fact that expert testimony is not required to prove such damages 
explains why Stevens-Henager provided non-expert testimony in opposing summary 
judgment and then cited that non-expert testimony to the district court at the summary 
judgment hearing. (R. 3332-35; 3574:13-14.) While counsel for Stevens-Henager stated 
at the summary judgment hearing that damages related to "the decline in enrollment" 
would be difficult to calculate without expert testimony, just a page later counsel states 
that Stevens-Henager had outlined its damages "in the depositions of Mr. Barney, 
Ms. Gastigar, Mr. Moss, of Ms. Dewsnup," the very non-expert testimony set forth in the 
opposition to the summary judgment motion. (R. 3574:13-14.) Stevens-Henager 
therefore did not concede that all damages required expert testimony. The fact that 
expert testimony is not required to establish all damages is fatal to Eagle Gate's 
argument, as the non-expert testimony is more than sufficient to establish that Eagle 
Gate's conduct proximately caused damage to Stevens-Henager. 
Because Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment was fashioned to address 
only whether Stevens-Henager had suffered "any damages," when Stevens-Henager 
provides some evidence of damages, the motion should have been denied in its entirety. 
When the non-expert testimony is construed in the light most favorable to Stevens-
Henager, the testimony is sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact concerning 
damages. This court should reverse the order granting summary judgment to permit 
Stevens-Henager to present evidence of its damages to a jury. 
8 
II. In Light of the Erroneous Summary Judgment Ruling, This Court Should 
Allow the District Court to Reconsider Its (i) Dismissal of CFAA Claims; 
(ii) Exclusion of Evidence of Damages at Trial; and (iii) Striking of an Expert 
Report on Damages 
If this court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment, it also should 
reverse subsequent orders based, at least in part, upon the gr^nt of summary judgment. 
McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Since the partial summary 
judgment set into play the entire chain of subsequent proceedings, we also reverse all 
subsequent orders and judgments and remand the case for triftl."). Eagle Gate argues that 
this court should affirm those orders on independent grounds because the subsequent 
orders were only based "in part" on the order granting summary judgment. (Resp. Br. at 
38-43.) In essence, Eagle Gate asks this court to presume th^t the district court would 
have reached the same results absent the summary judgment brder, even though the 
district court cited the summary judgment order as a basis for those results. If the district 
court would have reached the same result, then the district co i^rt can do so if Eagle Gate 
renews its motions on remand and allows the district court to decide that issue for itself. 
As outlined in the opening brief, there are three subsequent orders based upon the 
trial court's summary judgment ruling. In the first order entered on May 30, 2008, the 
district court granted Eagle Gate's motion to strike the report|of Stevens-Henager's 
damages expert "[b]ased on the Court's prior rulings," including the rulings on Eagle 
Gate's motion for summary judgment and Stevens-Henager'sj motion to reconsider the 
order granting summary judgment. (R. 3994.) Because the district court struck an expert 
report, (R. 3994), and previously denied Stevens-Henager's request for an extension to 
provide that expert report, (R. 3566), the district court should be permitted to reconsider 
its ruling in light of this court's decision issued today in Welsfr v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 
9 
2010 UT App 171, P.3d (holding that trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
expert testimony for failure to submit a timely expert report). Thus, not only should the 
district court reconsider the May 30, 2008 order in the absence of the erroneous summary 
judgment order, it also should reconsider that order in light of the standards set forth in 
Welsh. 
The second and third orders were both entered on August 31, 2009. In the second 
order, the district court granted Eagle Gate's motion in limine to exclude any evidence of 
monetary damages—a motion necessary only because there is evidence of monetary 
damages-—on the ground that the remaining prayer for injunctive relief does not require 
proof of damages, and therefore, evidence of monetary damages is irrelevant. (R. 4368.) 
And in the third order, the district court dismissed Stevens-Henager's claim for injunctive 
relief and attorney fees under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on the ground that 
Stevens-Henager could not prove damages totaling at least $5,000, a requirement under 
CFAA. (R. 4366.) 
The August 31, 2009 orders deserve particular attention because they are 
necessarily based on the summary judgment ruling that dismissed Stevens-Henager's 
damages remedy for all claims. Eagle Gate argues that the absence of expert testimony 
concerning damages, not summary judgment on Stevens-Henager5 s damages remedy, 
explains why the district court precluded any evidence of damages at trial. (Resp. Br. at 
43.) Frankly, this argument makes no sense. The exclusion of expert testimony, or, more 
precisely, the striking of an expert report, does not compel the exclusion of non-expert 
testimony at trial. Non-expert testimony, by definition, does require an expert. 
10 
Eagle Gate also argues that the district court did not dismiss the CFAA claims 
because damages were no longer in play, even though the district court expressly states 
that it dismissed those claims because Stevens-Henager could not make a threshold 
showing that it suffered at least $5,000 in damages. (Resp. Br. at 43-44.) Of course, 
there is no basis for concluding before trial that Stevens-Henager's damages will not total 
more than $5,000, and this court should reject Eagle Gate's unsupported assertion to the 
contrary. This court should refuse to speculate about what damages the jury will award 
based upon the non-expert testimony. 
Because the subsequent orders are based on the district court's grant of summary 
judgment, if this court reverses the order granting summary judgment, this court also 
should vacate these subsequent orders, without prejudice, to permit the district court to 
consider them in the absence of its summary judgment ruling. If Eagle Gate is correct 
that those orders rest upon independent grounds, then the district court can make the 
determination on remand. 
Conclusion 
In the end, this appeal is very simple. Stevens-Henager provided evidence that it 
suffered damages as a result of Eagle Gate's illegal conduct. Because there is a disputed 
issue of fact concerning damages, this court should vacate th^ order granting summary 
judgment to Eagle Gate. And because three subsequent ordei+s were based upon the 
erroneous summary judgment ruling, this court should vacate those orders as well to 
permit the district court to consider its rulings in the absence Of the summary judgment 
ruling. This court should reverse. 
11 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2010. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Troy L. Boofier 
Attorney for Appellant Stevens-Henager 
College 
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